Individuals can insure themselves perfectly against uncertainty about the length of life by purchasing deferred annuities early in life. In the absence of other uninsurable uncertainties (e.g. income), there will be no residual purchases or sales of annuities later in life, thereby avoiding any adverse-selection. In contrast, the presence of such uncertainties creates an active residual annuity market based on the arrival of new information. We characterize the equilibrium in the residual annuity market and propose a new …nancial instrument, refundable annuities with a guaranteed refund price, which enables individuals who hold a portfolio of such annuities to better adjust their optimum consumption plan to di¤erent realizations. Refundable annuities are shown to be equivalent to annuity options, that is, options that, if exercised, enable the purchase of annuities later in life at a predetermined price. Holding a variety of refundable annuities is (ex-ante) welfare enhancing.
The Timing of Annuity Purchases
In the presence of a competitive annuity market, individuals can perfectly insure themselves against uncertainty with respect to the length of life by investing all their savings in deferred, long-term annuities. The implication of associating annuity purchases with savings is that the bulk of annuities are purchased throughout one's working phase. This stands in stark contrast to empirical evidence that most private annuities are purchased at ages close to retirement (in the US the average age of annuity purchasers is 62).
A recent survey in the UK (Gardner and Wadsworth (2004) ) reports that half of the individuals in the sample would, given the option, never annuitize.
This attitude is independent of speci…c annuity terms and prices. By far, the dominant reason given for the reluctance to annuitize was a "preference for ‡exibility". Among those willing to annuitize, the major factors that a¤ected their decision were health (those in good health more likely to annuitize), education, household size (less likely to annuitize as household size increases) and income (willing to channel higher earnings to annuities).
Lack of ‡exibility in holding annuities was interpreted by the respondents as inability to short-sell (or borrow against) early purchased annuities when personal circumstances make such sale desirable. Preference to sell annuities arises typically upon the realization of negative information about longevity (disability) or income. In this survey, the reluctance to purchase annuities early in life was hardly a¤ected by knowledge that annuities purchased later will be more expensive (due to adverse-selection).
Data about the timing of annuity purchases and surveys such as the above suggest a need to develop a model that incorporates uninsurable risks, such as income (or 'needs' such as long-term care) in addition to longevity risk.
Further, to respond to individuals'desire for ‡exibility, the model should allow for short-sales of annuities purchased early or the purchase of additional shortterm annuities when so desired. We build the analysis on a model developed by Brugiavini (1993) with this objective in mind.
With uncertainty extending to other variables beyond longevity, competitive annuity markets cannot attain a First-Best allocation (which requires income transfers across states of nature). Sequential annuity market equilibrium is characterized by the purchase of long-term annuities early in life, short-sale of some of these annuities or the purchase of additional short-term annuities later-on, upon the arrival of information relevant for decisions on optimum consumption.
Since the competitive equilibrium is Second-Best, it is natural to ask whether there are …nancial instruments which, if available, are (ex-ante) welfare improving. We answer this question in the a¢ rmative, proposing a new type of refundable annuities. These are annuities that can be refunded at a later date, if so desired, at a pre-determined price. Holding a portfolio of such refundable annuities with varying refund prices allows individuals more ‡exibil-ity in adjusting their consumption path upon the arrival of information about longevity and other relevant factors such as income.
It is shown below that refundable annuities are equivalent to annuity options. These are options that entitle the holder to purchase annuities at a later date at a pre-determined price.
Interestingly, annuity options are available in the UK. It is worth quoting from a textbook for actuaries (Fisher and Young (1965) ):
"Guaranteed Annuity Options. The option may not be exercised until a future date ranging perhaps from 5 to 50 years hence... The mortality and interest assumptions should be conservative... The estimates of future improvement implied by experience from which mortality tables were constructed suggest that there should be di¤erences in rates according to the year in which the option is exercisable... A di¤erence of about 1 4 % in the yield per $100 purchase price could arise between one option and another exercisable ten years later... (Such) di¤erences in guaranteed annuity rates according to the future date on which they are exercisable do therefore seem to be justi…ed in theory" (Actuarial Practice of Life Assurance, p. 421).
The new behavioral economics literature seems to provide additional support to the o¤ering of annuity options which involve a small present cost and allow postponement of decisions to purchase annuities. It has been argued (e.g. Thaler and Benartzi (2004) and Laibson (1997) ) that these features provide a positive inducement to purchase annuities for individuals with tendencies to procrastinate or heavily discount the short-run future. Expected lifetime utility, V; is
where u 0 (c) > 0; u 00 (c) < 0 and u 0 (0) = 1:
The economy's resource constraint is
Optimum consumption, the solution to maximization of (1) 
where
is expected lifetime. We shall now show that a competitive long-term annuity market attains the First-Best allocation.
(b) Annuity Market Equilibrium: No Late Transactions
In period one, the issuers of annuities can distinguish between those who purchase additional annuities ('lenders') and those who short-sell period zero annuities ('borrowers'). Since borrowing and lending activities are distinguishable, their prices may be di¤erent. Denote the lending price by q 
The F.O.C. are
and
Denote the solutions to (6) - (8) that whenâ 1 (p) > 0; so (7) holds with equality, @â 1 @p > 0 and whenb 1 (p) > 0;
so (8) holds with equality, @b 1 @p < 0. A higher survival probability increases the amount of lending and decreases the amount of borrowing whenever these are positive.
Optimum consumption is strictly positive,ĉ i (p) > 0; i = 1; 2; for all p p p (this is ensured by the condition that u 0 (0) = 1).
At this point, assume that q
This condition ensures, by (7) - (8), that individuals are either lenders (â 1 > 0) or borrowers (b 1 > 0) and not both.
It is shown below that this condition always holds in equilibrium.
In period zero, individuals choose an amount a 0 that maximizes expected utility, anticipating optimum behavior in period one:
s.t. (6) . By the envelope theorem, the F.O.C. is
Denote the optimum amount of period zero annuities byâ 0 : Since in period zero all individuals are alike and purchase the same amount of annuities, the equilibrium price,q 0 ; is equal to expected lifetime, (4),
The equilibrium prices of a 1 and of b 1 ; denotedq ; respectively, are determined as follows.
When (7) holds with equality at the 'kink',â 1 =b 1 = 0; this determines a survival probability, p a ; p a = q 1 1 ; where
withâ 0 determined by (10) and (11):
Whenâ 1 (p) =b 1 (p) = 0 for all p; p p p; then, from (13), = 1
(because marginal utilities are independent of p). When p a < p then, by (7),
Using a similar argument for short-sales, de…ne
The equilibrium prices,q ; are determined by zero expected pro…ts conditions for a pooling equilibrium:
Equilibrium prices are seen to be weighted averages of survival probabilities of those who purchase or sell short-term annuities, with equilibrium quantities bought or sold serving as weights.
Note that the bounds of integration, p a and p b ; depend on the equilibrium Proposition 1: when uncertainty is con…ned to future survival probabilities, consumers purchase early in life an amount of annuities that generates zero demand for annuities in older ages, ensuring a consumption path that is independent of the state of nature (ĉ 1 andĉ 2 independent of p). Consequently, there will be no annuity transactions late in life.
Proof: Appendix. This stark conclusion is in contrast to overwhelming empirical evidence which shows that private annuities are purchased by individuals in advanced ages 1 . Indeed, we shall now show that the above conclusion does not carry-over to more realistic cases with uncertainty about (uninsurable) other variables, such as income, in addition to survival probabilities.
Sequential Equilibrium Under Uncertain Survival and Uncertain Future Incomes
Suppose that in period zero, the probability of survival to period two and the level of income in period one, y 1 ; are both uncertain, their realizations occurring at the beginning of period one 2 . The realized levels of p and y 1 are assumed to be private information unknown to the issuers of annuities. For simplicity, assume that y 1 is distributed independently of p. Its distribution, denoted by G(y 1 ); has the support (y 1 ; y 1 ):
As before, the First-Best allocation maximizes expected utility, (1), subject to the resource constraint
Again, the solution is independent of p: c 1 = c 2 = y 0 + E(y 1 ) 1 + E(p) : However, unlike the previous case where the early purchase of annuities could fully insure against survival uncertainty and, consequently, implement the First-Best allocation, it is seen from (17) that the First-Best solution with income uncertainty requires income transfers, providing the expected level of income to everyone.
Indeed, income insurance would enable such transfers. However, for obvious reasons, the level of realized income must be assumed to be private information and this precludes insurance contingent on the level of income. Consequently, the annuity market cannot, in general, attain the First-Best allocation.
1 See Brown et-al (2001). 2 An alternative formulation is to make utility in period one depend on a parameter ('needs'), whose value is unknown in period zero and realized at the beginning of period one. This formulation yields the same results as below.
(b) Sequential Annuity Market Equilibrium
As before, maximization is done backwards. In period one, utility maximization w.r.t. a 1 yields the F.O.C.
with equality whenâ 1 > 0: Settingâ 1 =b 1 = 0 and (18) with equality Figure 1) . To make the pattern displayed in Figure (1 : That is, the borrowing price is lower than the lending price 3 . We shall show that this condition is always satis…ed in equilibrium 
whereâ 1 (p; ) =
1 (p; y 1 )dG(y 1 ); are total demands for a 1 and b 1 , respectively, by all relevant income recipients with a given p.
Recall thatâ 1 andb 1 depend implicitly on q 
Clearly, such that '(p) S 0 as p Sp: It follows that
Thus, the condition for an equilibrium with active lending and borrowing in period one is satis…ed.
As before, the equilibrium price for period zero annuities is equal to life expectancy:q
Of course, 0 <q 0 < 1: Notice that, sinceâ 1 (p; ) strictly increases and b 1 (p; ) strictly decreases in p, 1 >q 
Refundable Annuities
We have seen that when uncertainty early in life is con…ned to longevity then the optimum purchase of long-term annuities provides perfect protection against this uncertainty. Consequently, all annuity transactions occur early in life with no residual activities at later ages and hence no adverse selection (Proposition 1). In contrast, when faced with uninsurable uncertainties in addition to longevity, individuals are induced to adjust their portfolios upon the arrival of new information. These adjustments are characterized by adverse selection, re ‡ected in a higher price for (short-term) annuities purchased and a lower price for annuities sold. Recall that in the above discussion we have allowed the purchase of short-term annuities late in life as well as the short sale of long-term annuities purchased earlier. In spite of these "pro-market" assumptions, asymmetric information generates adverse selection.
In these circumstances, we pose the following question: are there …nancial instruments which, if available, may improve the market allocation in terms of expected utility 4 ? We answer this question in the a¢ rmative by proposing a new …nancial instrument that may achieve this goal. The proposal is to have a new class of annuities, each carrying a guaranteed commitment by the issuer to refund the annuity, when presented by the holder, at a (pre) speci…ed price.
Call these (guaranteed) refundable annuities.
As shown below, the short-sale of annuities purchased in period zero is equivalent to the purchase in period zero of refundable annuities whose refund price is equal toq 2 1 : Therefore, in order to improve upon this allocation, it is proposed that individuals will hold a portfolio composed of a variety of refundable annuities with di¤erent refund prices. The purchase of refundable annuities with di¤erent refund prices will provide more ‡exibility in adjusting consumption to the arrival of information about longevity and income. With regular annuities, the revenue per annuity from short-sales in period one is independent of the quantity of annuities sold. With a variety of refundable annuities, this revenue may vary: depending on the realization of longevity and income, individuals will sell refundable annuities in descending order, from the highest guaranteed refund price and down. 
0:
Consider …rst only one type of refundable annuities. For any realization of y 1 , consumption in periods one and two is:
where a 1 0 are (short-term) annuities purchased in period one at a price of q 1 and q r 0 is the price of the refundable annuity 5 .
In view of (11), maximization of (1) 
Denote the solutions to these equations byb r 1 (p; y 1 ); andâ 1 (p; y 1 ): Again, these functions implicitly depend on y 0 q r 0 a r 0 ; r and q 1 : The optimum level of period zero annuities is determined by maximization of expected utility, (3), assuming an optimum choice, (ĉ 1 ;ĉ 2 ); in period one. The F.O.C. is
Denote the solution to (16) byâ r 0 : The equilibrium priceq r 0 satis…es a zero expected pro…ts condition:
whileq 1 is determined by (8) .
Two observations are in place. First, a condition for an active annuity market in period zero is that r <q 1 . This is equivalent to the requirement above (with no refundable annuities) thatq 
Individuals'consumption is now given by
Maximization of (5) 
where the expectation is over p and y 1 .
The value of holding a diversi…ed optimum portfolio of refundable annuities clearly depends on speci…c assumptions about risk attitudes (utility function) and the joint distribution of longevity and income. To provide insight plan to do detailed calculations and report them in a separate paper 6 .
Equivalence of Refundable Annuities and Annuity Options
We shall demonstrate that refundable annuities are equivalent to options to purchase annuities at a later date for a pre-determined price. In terms of the above three period model, suppose that individuals can purchase in period zero options, each of which entitles the owner to purchase in period one an annuity at a given price. As before, the payout of each annuity is $1 in period two if the owner is alive and nothing if dead. Denote by o( ) the price of an option that, if exercised, entitles the holder to purchase in period one an annuity at a price of : On a time scale, the scheme is as follows:
Annuity Options
The comparable scheme for refundable annuities is:
Refundable Annuities
It is seen that whenq who put a high discount rate on short-run saving. Thaler and Benartzi report that their plan has been successfully implemented by a number of …rms. There seem to be parallels between the psychological insight that motivated this plan and the proposed options to annuitize at a later date.
We have seen in the text thatb 1 (p) = 0 whenâ 1 (p) > 0 and (7) ] dF (p) > 0 (A.7)
Note that dâ 1 (p) dq 1 1 in (A.7) is the total derivative ofâ 1 (p) w.r.t. q 
